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РЕГИОНАЛИЗМ В УСЛОВИЯХ
ГЛОБАЛИЗАЦИИ**

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В сборнике материалов научно-практической конференции включены статьи преподавателей, аспирантов и студентов зарубежных, российских и московских высших учебных заведений, а также тезисы докладов, представленные на пленарном заседании.

Материалы освещают круг вопросов, связанных с регионализацией глобальных процессов в мировой экономике и политике. Авторами рассматривались как общие тенденции развития мирового хозяйства, так и региональная специфика отдельных регионов и стран, а также тенденции развития отраслей мирового и национального хозяйства.

Издание предназначено для преподавателей, аспирантов и студентов экономических специальностей.

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поддержать свои предприятия. В Татарстане, наоборот, кризис значительно увеличил объемы помощи предприятиям малых городов.

Происходит изменение сложившихся стратегий поведения населения на рынке труда. Люди возвращаются к ЛПХ, которое уже успели забыть за несколько лет высоких доходов. Помимо ЛПХ, набирает обороты самозанятость в сборе дикоросов, рыбной ловле, неформальной занятости на малых предприятиях деревообработки, пр.

Происходит возвращение части людей с вахт (из регулярных трудовых миграций), причем возвращаются наименее квалифицированные кадры. В результате напряженность на рынке труда малых городов растет – это люди с завышенными запросами не вписываются в формат рынка труда малого города. В то же время растет легализация многих сфер жизни – в первую очередь сокращаются нелегальные работники и отменяются дополнительные выплаты, которые тоже имели нелегальную форму.

Разные модели организации рынка труда малых городов по-разному отреагировали на воздействие кризиса. Положение моноспециализированных городов оказалось в прямой зависимости от состояния градообразующего предприятия. Города с отсутствием основного работодателя характеризуются меньшей амплитудой изменений на рынке труда, но в целом уровень снижения экономической активности выше. Города-транспортные центры, несмотря на достаточно стабильное положение сферы транспорта и диверсификацию экономики, столкнулись с проблемой возвратных трудовых миграций.

SOME ASPECTS OF REGIONAL DISPARITIES IN THE ERA OF TRANSITION AND GLOBALIZATION. THE CASE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

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
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The political and economic transformation beginning with the early 1990s and the complex implications of globalization during the last two decades have caused serious changes in the spatial structure of the Russian Federation. This fact has made the country a popular subject of geographical and regional

economic analyses both among Russian and foreign experts, whose relating research projects have focused mainly on the spatial differences of the volume and branch structure of production [1] [2], or on regional disparities of income and well-being and their reasons [3] [4] [5] [6]. In this paper we examine some issues that, although being very important, are relatively underemphasized in concerning works. First, we reveal *some major tendencies of spatial disparities before the 1990s* as later trends can also not be interpreted and evaluated correctly (or they can be misinterpreted easily) if their antecedents remain unidentified. Second, in the light of the results we discuss the question how the *relative position of given regions has changed* in the course of time, or with other words, to what extent the transition and globalization have restructured the spatial pattern of economic well-being. Third, we present the crucial role played by the way of *choosing the statistical indicator* from alternative possibilities in our results and findings, paying particular consideration to the issue of spatial deflators and the *'real' purchase power of income*. And fourth, *social disparities within the regions* and spatial differences of this phenomenon are also discussed.

Trying to reveal the level of spatial disparities of income type indicators (such as per capita GRP or income) for the period before the 1990s is quite a difficult task in the case of Russia as the value of such indicators was usually published only at national level in the communist era, a fact being rooted in the highly centralized nature of the Soviet legislative and administrative system. Furthermore, numerous indicators not only remained unpublished but had not been registered at regional level at all as ministries being responsible for given branches of the whole country showed moderate interest towards them [7]. In this respect an interesting exception was the endeavour to put the command system of the economy on a regional basis against the branch-oriented one through the establishment of the people's economic councils in the late 1950s, a phase of cautious regionalisation [8]. Although the last years of the next decade put an end to the initiative, relating scientific work had begun in between, opening the way for the collection and release of different kinds of regional statistics. In her work L. Telepko published the per capita income values of the 18 Soviet economic districts among which 10 belonged fully to the Russian SSR (the Kaliningrad Oblast was a part of the Baltic economic district) [9]. Although these districts were disestablished with the end of the Soviet regime, thanks to the official statistics of the Russian Federal Service of State Statistics or Rosstat (and to those of its predecessor, the Goskomstat) the income level of the 83 federal subjects (forming the first subnational level with an own government in the Russian administrative system) can be aggregated according to the boundaries of the formerly existing 10 districts (Map 1.).



Map 1. The economic districts of the Russian SSR (abbreviations: CBE – Central Black Earth; VV – Volga-Vyatka)

The results indicate *a strong divergence of per capita income during the last two decades of the Soviet Union, and a remarkable convergence since 1990*: in 1968, the value of the ‘richest’ district was 1.51 times higher than that of the ‘poorest’ one, this ratio reached 3.12 by 1990, and dropped back to 1.91 by 2008 (Table 1). Some remarkable changes in the order of the districts can also be observed. Between 1968 and 1990 incomes rose dramatically in the Asian part of Russia as a result of rapidly improving extraction of their mineral resources, but the advantage of these regions reduced significantly in the last two decades. Meanwhile, the Central Black Earth, North Caucasus and Volga districts, traditionally characterized by a lower level of industrialization and a higher proportion of agriculture, has constantly belonged to the ‘poorest’ regions in the long term, while the Central district (containing the capital city of Moscow, the ultimate peak of Russian settlement hierarchy) has been the only one always being above the Russian average, with a somewhat weakening position in the 1970s and 1980s (generally not because of a real dropback but as a result of the rapid development of the Asian districts that also exerted an influence on the Russian average), but gaining momentum again after the transition.

Table 1.

Per capita income of the Russian economic districts compared to the average of the Russian SSR/Russian Federation.

1968		1990		2008	
District	%	District	%	District	%
Central	133.7	East Siberian	191.6	Central	140.3
Northwestern	132.7	West Siberian	141.9	West Siberian	108.4
Volga-Vyatka	119.9	Far Eastern	136.6	Far Eastern	105.3
Urals	115.0	Central	112.2	Northwestern	102.1
Far Eastern	107.6	Volga	89.7	Urals	94.8
West Siberian	106.0	Urals	89.5	East Siberian	87.4
East Siberian	91.6	Volga-Vyatka	88.2	Volga	81.0
Volga	91.2	CBE	86.5	CBE	76.7
N Caucasus	90.3	N Caucasus	81.1	Volga-Vyatka	75.0
CBE	88.5	Northwestern	61.5	N Caucasus	73.4
<i>RUSSIA</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>RUSSIA</i>	<i>100.0</i>	<i>RUSSIA</i>	<i>100.0</i>

Own calculations based on [9] [10]

However, *the processes mirrored by these simple data sets are diametrically opposed to the major common findings of relating researches from the last two decades which indicate a strong divergence in the Russian Federation in the era of transition [4] [5] [6], and they also contradict the analyses revealing a similar tendency of growing regional disparities in the East Central European post-communist countries [11] [12]. The seeming controversy can be traced back to a methodological issue, namely the direct comparison of different geographical levels: an indisputable convergence of the 10 economic districts and a massive divergence of the 83 federal subjects indicate the absolutely possible tendency of growing disparities within the boundaries of the former economic districts. This process can be understood easily as economic districts were established as complex and specialized units of territorial production [13], with complexity manifested rather at district level and specialization characterizing foremost the subjects or cities (also lower-level units) belonging to the same district. As such – often monostructural – lower-level regions were strongly exposed to thorough sectoral changes [14], they followed remarkably different paths of development after 1991, with some of them belonging to the ‘winners’ of transformation while others facing deep recession.*

An alternative possibility to reveal the long-term evolution of spatial disparities is offered by Human Development Reports of the UN Development

Programme. These documents release the value of HDI for most subjects for several years between 1979 and 2007. Although earlier reports are not totally comprehensive, the time series of 73 subjects (representing almost 98% of the total population) can be compiled based on them. The Gini coefficient calculated on these data sets chimes in with the analyses indicating strong divergence after the transformation, but also reveals that (with strengthening economic problems and much limited possibilities of spatial redistribution of financial resources) *regional disparities began to grow slowly just as early as the second part of the 1980s*, even if this tendency was much more moderate than in the 1990s (Table 2.).

Table 2.

Gini coefficient of HDI of selected 73 Russian subjects.

Year	1979	1985	1989	1994	2002	2007
Gini	0.0143	0.0122	0.0129	0.0194	0.0226	0.0261

Own calculations based on [15] [16]

It is also an important question what kind of regional changes stand in the background of these tendencies, or, with other words, to what extent has the *relative* development position of the regions changed in these almost three decades. Comparing the HDI *values* of given regions for different years in order to give an answer to this question is a popular method in relating papers [15]. Following this approach the Spearman rank correlation coefficient can be calculated among regional data sets for selected years: the results indicate gradual but significant changes in the 1980s and early 1990s, while the stabilization of the economy seemingly leads to the emergence of a spatial pattern somewhat similar to that of the late 1970s (Table 3.). However, these results can be highly misleading as they presumably mirror foremost the overall tendencies of recession and growth in Russia, and not unconditionally the changing relative position of the regions.

Thus, focusing on the *rank order* of the subjects according to their HDI values is a much better solution to reveal real changes in the order of the regions. In this case the rank correlation analysis mirrors generally similar tendencies to those based on the value of HDI, but lower absolute values indicate somewhat less stability and more significant changes in time (Table 3.). The results clearly show that the *transformation cannot be interpreted as a phenomenon causing thorough changes in a spatial structure that had been rather stable before in the long term*. Instead, the order of regions according to HDI underwent serious alterations even in the 1980s (the biggest positive change happened in the case of some Far Eastern regions with rapidly improving export of mineral resources, the heavy industrial district of Southwest

Siberia also benefitting from strong financial support of the state, and the city of Moscow). It speaks volumes that the order of subjects in 1989 was more similar to that in 2007 than to that in 1979 (related rank correlation values are +0.61 and +0.59). Of course this finding does not deny the fact of significant spatial restructuring right after 1991, also indicated by our results. However, our findings reveal a more dynamic spatial structure which underwent important changes even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, while increasing similarities of the order of regions by 2002 and 2007 compared to that in 1979 indicate a kind of revival of some characteristics of the late Brezhnevian spatial structure after the uncertainties of the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Table 3.

Spearman rank correlation coefficient of regional data sets for selected years (results based on regional HDI *values* and on the *rank* of regions according to their HDI are presented separately).

	1979;1985	1979;1989	1979;1994	1979;2002	1979;2007
value	+0.85	+0.63	+0.42	+0.56	+0.64
rank	+0.77	+0.59	+0.25	+0.39	+0.48

Own calculations based on [15] and [16]

As for the tendencies of the post-Soviet period, this issue should also be investigated from different points of view. Related articles usually emphasize the robust divergence after the transition [4] [5] [6], a fact also confirmed by our calculations based on HDI statistics. However, the decision which aspect of economic development do we take into account strongly determines the results in this case. Regarding ‘economic development’ as something relating to production (which can be measured by per capita GRP, for instance) gives an insight into remarkably different processes than interpreting the same term as an improvement of economic well-being (e.g. rising per capita income). In order to show this, we have compiled a coherent data set of per capita GRP and income values of 79 Russian subjects (representing more than 99% of the country’s population) based on official statistics. Although the former one is available only for the time period beginning with 1996 (at least in a methodologically consistent form), the comparison of spatial inequalities of the two indicators reveals strikingly different trends (Figure 1.).

Regional disparities of *per capita income* at the level of the subjects almost tripled in *the first half of the 1990s* that was practically *the only ‘time of divergence’*: in this respect the spatial restructuring of the economy was a very fast process against a long-lasting gradual one. Later on, disparities of income remained rather stable for several years before opening the way for a new phase of convergence during the Putin administration. However, *inequalities of per*

capita GRP were rising dramatically even in the late 1990s without any signs of significant convergence after the turn of the millennium. These trends reveal how the Russian state began to intervene in spatial economic processes through various transfers (redistributing financial sources from the dynamic regions to the ones lagging far away behind them) as soon as it was enabled by the revival of the economy [6].




Figure 1. Gini coefficient of per capita GRP and per capita income in the selected 79 regions. Own calculations based on [10]

A rather similar tendency is mirrored by the spatial concentration index of GRP and income. While *economic production has become much more concentrated* than it had been before (especially as the proportion of Moscow of total GRP rose to 24.6% in 2008 from a value of 11.3% in 1996, thanks to the capital’s ability to convert its central role in politics and public and economic administration into direct economic advantage among the circumstances of transition and globalization), *the spatial allocation of total income is far not as concentrated as it was in the late 1990s* – a further evidence of the implications of state controlled spatial redistribution of financial resources in favour of ‘poorer’ regions (Figure 2.).

The figures presented above clearly reveal the difference between the spatial disparities of economic production and those of incomes. However, the regional characteristics of ‘real’ economic well-being could not be identified unless taking *spatial deflators*, the regionally differing purchase power of a

given sum of money into consideration. This factor has a very important role even in relatively small countries, e.g. while the cost of living in urban districts is significantly higher than in rural ones.




Figure 2. Herfindahl (concentration) index of per capita GRP and per capita income in the selected 79 regions. Own calculations based on [10]

In the case of such a huge country being the size of a continent regional differences of the purchasing power of income can be even much higher because of extremely altering physical geographical (foremost climatic) conditions and big distances that had to be surmounted. Although official Russian statistics are about nominal incomes, the real purchase power of the latter ones can be estimated if they are *divided by the officially calculated subsistence minimum*, released for each region.

Table 4.

Gini coefficient of per capita nominal and 'real' income of the 79 regions.

	1995	1999	2008
Per capita nominal income	0.2773	0.2962	0.2091
Per capita 'real' income	0.1957	0.2057	0.1439

Own calculations based on [10]


As for these 'real' incomes, their spatial disparities in various years mirror *the same tendency in time* as those of nominal income *but the level of*

inequalities is significantly smaller (Table 4.). This finding can be hardly wondered at as prices can usually be higher in areas with higher incomes, and where prices are higher, labour force also tends to claim higher wages and salaries. Instead, it is the *changing regional pattern of income distribution* if purchase power is taken into account that reveals some highly important phenomena. If spatial disparities of nominal income are depicted on a thematic map, the following relations can be recognized: (i) Income level in the Asian subjects (as well as in the Urals) is usually significantly higher than in the European ones. (ii) In the European Russia a strong centre-periphery dichotomy exists with the city of Moscow as core. St. Petersburg, Murmansk and Samara (the centre of Russian car industry) can be identified as further rich poles. Among poorer regions a North-South slope can be seen with the lowest incomes in the South. (iii) In the Asian part, incomes are much higher in the Northern regions than in the Southern peripheral border zones (Map 2.).

However, before giving a detailed interpretation of these results, a map of 'real' incomes should also be analyzed (Map 3.). The obvious difference between the European and Asian regions vanishes. Except for some important raw material (natural gas and crude oil or gold, silver and precious ores) producing and exporting regions with relatively few inhabitants (Sakhalin, Chukotka, Zabaykalsky krai), most Asian subjects' 'real' income lies below the national average despite of their high nominal incomes. The rank of Kamchatka, for instance, is 66 places worse according to 'real' income, while the difference is 46 places for Khabarovsk and varies from 33 to 39 places in the case of Primorye, Yakutia and the Amur Oblast. This is a consequence of dramatically high costs of living that can be traced back foremost to enormous heating and transport costs (because of severe climate and huge distance from the economic core districts) [17]. Thus, advantageous nominal income conditions do not mean a high level of economic well-being: in fact, even with state transfers, some of these regions belong to the poorest ones in Russia in. The North-South slope in the European part of the country disappears as well, therefore the dichotomy of some rich urban districts and the periphery becomes even more obvious. However, *the richness of the Western Siberian oil and gas producing regions* and that of the important ore extracting districts in the Urals *is not virtual* but is an indisputable fact. Although the cost of living is also high here, extremely high incomes profoundly balance it.


As for the level of income, there is one more fact highly important from the aspect of spatial disparities, namely the issue of *wages remaining hidden from statistics*. According to an estimation of Rosstat, ca. 40% of total income is not mirrored by official data sets. By the way, not all of these wages are illegal as wages of employees in small business also belong to this unregistered category for regulatory reasons [16] [18]. Although it is almost impossible to

gain further information on the spatial (or even social) distribution of this vast amount of money, some findings of relating international researches should be considered. In the post-communist Hungary alternative estimation methods to reveal the real income situation of the population in the microregions (150 units at the time when the analyses were made) indicated *somewhat smaller regional disparities in case 'grey' and 'black' incomes are considered*. However, these findings *merely affect the general spatial pattern of income disparities* [19]. Following this way of reasoning we can suppose that taking unregistered sources of income into account would mirror somewhat smaller inequalities but with a basically similar regional pattern.



Map 2. Per capita nominal income of the Russian subjects. Own map and calculations based on the data sets of [10]

A final question that should be investigated is the level of disparities *within* given regions, also at an even lower level. Here a possible method is the analysis of internal social income disparities of the regions compared to those at national level. In the actual case we use the income ratio of the richest and poorest 20% of the population as an indicator of this kind of inequality. As an implication of the transformation and the collapse of state level financial redistribution *social disparities of income began to rise in Russia in the early 1990s, and they gained a new impetus with the revival of the economy after the turn of the millennium* (economic growth with polarisation) (Figure 3.).



Map 3. Per capita 'real' income of the Russian subjects. Own map and calculations based on the data sets of [10]





Figure 3. The income ratio of the richest and the poorest 20% of the society (based on nominal income). Own calculations based on [10]

However, although social disparities of this kind also grew in almost all federal subjects in the meanwhile, the level of inequalities varies significantly by regions. Generally speaking, there is *a rather strong positive connection between the level of 'real' per capita incomes and the disparities of nominal incomes* (Map 4.). The rank correlation coefficient of these two regional data sets for 2008 is +0.79. This remarkably high value reveals a similar regularity at regional level to that at the national one: higher productivity is accompanied by bigger disparities as a disproportional segment of real economic production (especially in the leading branches of energy production and high-level services, the main engines of Russian economic growth) is controlled by a relatively small number of investors. On the other hand, social disparities of economic well-being are relatively moderate in the underdeveloped peripheries as a major part of their incomes originates from transfers whose distribution is much more equal as a matter of course.



Map 4. The income ratio of the richest and the poorest 20% in the regions of Russia. Own map and calculations based on [10]

Concluding the results, the growth of regional economic disparities can be traced back before the transition in the early 1990s. Divergence of the big economic districts was a matter of fact during the 1970s and 1980s, while gradual regional divergence also began in the second part of the 1980s (also significantly redistributing the order of regions) – even if the strongest ‘time of divergence’ was the first period of the 1990s. Later on, differences of the big economic districts have decreased while inequalities at the level of subjects

followed a more complicated path. While an increasing regional gap and a stronger and stronger concentration to a few core regions are characterizing economic production, spatial disparities of income have tended to decrease in the last years as the revival of the economy enabled the state to intervene efficiently through financial redistribution. A new convergence of economic well-being can be detected especially well if considering the real purchase power of regional incomes – although it is only because several seemingly prosperous Asian subjects are poor in fact. As for social disparities, they are steadily rising not only at national level but in most regions as well, although this tendency can be revealed foremost in the most prosperous subjects.

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ЭТНОКУЛЬТУРНЫЕ ОСОБЕННОСТИ РЕГИОНАЛЬНОЙ ИДЕНТИЧНОСТИ НАСЕЛЕНИЯ ЧУВАШСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ¹⁵

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Интересы стратегического управления территориальным развитием России неизбежно требуют учета всех, даже малозначительных, факторов. Одним из таких аспектов, на наш взгляд, является этническая среда, которая определяется взаимодействием двух или нескольких народов,

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